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GOING … GOING … PUBLIC? TAKING A
UNITED STATES PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS LEAGUE PUBLIC
IAN A. MCLIN
ABSTRACT
The four major American professional sports leagues—the
MLB, NBA, NHL, and NFL—are wildly popular, but the leagues
fail to capitalize fully on their success because they are organized
in a largely inefficient manner. By organizing as unincorporated
non-profits, leagues forgo their ability to raise capital via investors, forcing taxpayers to bear the burden of league investments
such as new stadium construction. Further, the current organizational model creates a collective action problem, as self-interested
team owners focus their support on actions that benefit their own
franchise and leave ineffective commissioners in power.
A solution to these problems is for a professional sports league
to incorporate and organize as a publicly traded company. The application of the corporate model to the sports world is not a new
concept—several individual franchises have “gone public” over the
years. But, because of concerns arising from the fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty, the corporate model is much more viable for an
entire league rather than an individual team.

The author is a J.D. Candidate at William & Mary Law School; B.A. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He thanks his parents, Stuart and
Catherine McLin, for their unwavering support and encouragement throughout
his education. He also thanks the staff of the William & Mary Business Law
Review for their tireless effort in preparing this Note for publication.
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INTRODUCTION
Professional sports dominate today’s world. Entire networks,
radio channels, and websites dedicate twenty-four seven coverage
to the latest trade, hiring or firing of coaches, or injury. Even the
slightest of scandals sends the media into a frenzy, as fans demand
details about their favorite or least favorite athletes.1 The nearcommunal watching of large-scale sporting events such as the Super
Bowl has become somewhat of a national pastime.2 The National
Football League (NFL) practically “owns a day of the week.”3
Yet, in America’s four major professional sports leagues—the
NFL, Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL)—it is
the team owners that benefit financially from the rising popularity
of sports in today’s world.4 Owners have virtually infinite power to
operate their teams in the manner that most pleases them,5 often
to the dismay of fans.6 Moreover, despite the popularity of each
See, e.g., Eric Wilbur, #Deflategate, and the Stupidity Surrounding It, Has
Reached Its Fever Pitch, BOSTON.COM (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.boston
.com/sports/columnists/wilbur/2015/01/deflategate_stupidity_has_reached_its
_fever_pitch.html [https://perma.cc/ZT43-AT3B].
2 See Henry D. Fetter, Super Bowl: More Proof That Football Is America’s
Real Favorite Pastime, ATLANTIC (Feb. 5, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com
/entertainment/archive/2012/02/super-bowl-more-proof-that-football-is-americas
-real-favorite-pastime/252500/ [https://perma.cc/G2ZR-VF62].
3 CONCUSSION (Columbia Pictures 2015). Concussion portrays Dr. Bennet
Omalu’s advocacy concerning the long-lasting effects resulting from repeated
concussions. Id. In the film, a fellow doctor warns Omalu not to take on the
NFL: “You’re going to war with a corporation that owns a day of the week.” Id.
4 League profits are distributed among team owners. See MARK CONRAD,
THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS: A PRIMER FOR JOURNALISTS 14 (2d ed. 2011).
5 Owners have “complete decision-making authority within the team” and
are “able to hire and fire all staff, including players, if they so desire.” 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPORTS MANAGEMENT AND MARKETING 1067 (Linda E. Swayne &
Mark Dodds eds. 2011).
6 Such complete authority often results in resentment from fans in light of
an owner’s poor decision-making. See, e.g., Ian Begley, Knicks Fans Organize
Protest, ESPN (Mar. 6, 2014), http://espn.go.com/new-york/nba/story/_/id/1056
1854/new-york-knicks-fans-stage-protest-madison-square-garden-game [https://
perma.cc/M38R-Q2H6] (describing a planned protest of New York Knicks
owner James Dolan for a “systematic and consistently recurring lack of responsible decision-making”); Jason Epstein, Redskins Fans Really Don’t Like Dan
Snyder, NAT. REV.: RIGHT FIELD (Dec. 12, 2014, 12:19 PM), http://www.national
1
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league, a significant portion of the financial responsibility for
large-scale investments, such as new stadiums, is placed upon the
local taxpayer, not the wealthy owner.7
This Note examines whether professional sports leagues should
become publicly traded corporations. In doing so, Part I first discusses the popular proposal among academics that individual
sports franchises should incorporate and “go public,”8 ultimately
rejecting such a proposal due to legal concerns surrounding the
ability of a publicly traded franchise’s board of directors to comply
with the necessary fiduciary duties. Part II explains how the concerns surrounding directors’ fiduciary duties in the context of individual sports franchises pose no such problem in the context of
a publicly traded sports league. Finally, Part III examines the benefits of an incorporated sports league. These benefits include: the
promotion of more efficient behavior via elimination of the collective
action problem that currently plagues each of the major professional sports leagues, a massive influx of capital via initial public
offering (IPO), and additional future opportunities for capital infusion through the issuance of new shares. Such capital infusions
may remove the burden on local taxpayers to pay for increasingly
expensive new stadiums and grow the opportunity for leagues to
expand into new markets in our increasingly globalized world.9
I. PUBLICLY TRADED INDIVIDUAL SPORTS FRANCHISES
Nearly all of the scholarship examining the application of the
corporate model to sports has revolved around the concept of a
review.com/right-field/394693/redskins-fans-really-dont-dan-snyder-jason-epstein
[https://perma.cc/AZF3-LWBU] (discussing how Washington Redskins fans are
so disgruntled with owner Dan Snyder that 82 percent of poll respondents would
support a plan to move the Redskins to Los Angeles if it meant Washington
could start over with a new expansion team within three years); ‘Free the birds’:
Orioles Fans Walk Out in Protest, ESPN (Sept. 21, 2006), http://sports.espn.go
.com/mlb/news/story?id=2597721 [https://perma.cc/MJM7-VCRH] (describing a
demonstration involving a mass exodus of fans from a Baltimore Orioles baseball game in protest of owner Peter Angelos).
7 KEVIN J. DELANEY & RICK ECKSTEIN, PUBLIC DOLLARS, PRIVATE STADIUMS:
THE BATTLE OVER BUILDING SPORTS STADIUMS 25–26 (2003).
8 See generally infra note 10.
9 See infra Section III.B.
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publicly traded sports team, rather than a league.10 This is likely
the result of the fact that there is some precedent for a publicly
traded sports franchise, as, over time, several major American
sports franchises have conducted IPOs.11 Most notably, the Cleveland Indians listed four million shares on the NASDAQ in 1998, ultimately raising more than sixty million dollars.12 The Boston Celtics
operated as a publicly owned franchise for almost twenty years,
from 1986 to 2002.13 Other teams have flirted with communitybased ownership, such as the Green Bay Packers who raised almost
twenty-four million dollars in 1997 through the issuance of more
than one hundred thousand shares.14
However, despite the relative success of the above franchises
in issuing shares, other franchises have not followed suit.15 These
See, e.g., Robert Bacon, Comment, Initial Public Offerings and Professional
Sports Teams: The Regulations Work, but are Owners and Investors Listening?,
10 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 139, 140–41 (2000) (arguing that the 1933 and
1934 Securities and Exchange Acts deter individual team IPOs due to fears
concerning public disclosure of financial information); Brian R. Cheffins, Playing the Stock Market: “Going Public” and Professional Team Sports, 24 J. CORP.
L. 641, 658, 660, 662 (1999) (suggesting that, while going public may be a popular notion in sports, owners are likely to be hesitant due to disclosure requirements, the cost of establishing an IPO, and the loss of autonomy that comes
with running a public corporation); Jorge E. Leal Garrett & Bryan A. Green,
Considerations for Professional Sports Teams Contemplating Going Public, 31
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 69, 70–71 (2010); Zachary A. Greenberg, Note, Tossing the
Red Flag: Official (Judicial) Review and Shareholder-Fan Activism in the Context of Publicly Traded Sports Teams, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1255, 1292 (2013)
(predicting that, despite the drawbacks of disclosure and several unresolved
legal issues, the “sports team corporation model ... should continue to gain momentum” due to the “limitless opportunity for capital infusion into the franchise”); Ryan Schaffer, Note, A Piece of the Rock (or the Rockets): The Viability
of Widespread Public Offerings of Professional Sports Franchises, 5 VA. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 201, 231 (2006) (concluding that public offerings of individual
sports teams are viable and focusing on the benefit of a publicly traded team’s
ability to finance their team through equity, rather than through debt).
11 See Bacon, supra note 10, at 146–52.
12 SCOTT R. ROSNER & KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS
35 (2d ed. 2011).
13 GIL FRIED & TIMOTHY D. MONDELLO, SPORT FINANCE 183 (3d ed. 2013).
14 Id. at 182.
15 Chad Fraser, 3 Pro Sports Stocks That Could Score You Big Profits, STREET
(Oct. 1, 2015, 11:35 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13307581/1/3 -pro
10
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franchises are correct to not follow, as the fiduciary constraints
that the law places on board members of publicly traded corporations make the corporate model incongruous to an individual
franchise.16
A. The Duty of Care
A corporation’s directors have a duty of care to act in the corporation’s best business interests.17 In making a decision, directors must “act … on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.”18 However, the business judgment rule typically protects the directors’ ultimate decision from examination.19 Courts
will generally defer to directors’ exercise of business judgment,
rather than “second-guess” the decision ex post.20 This is because
the directors’ “function is to encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the time made may seem a
wild hunch viewed years later against a background of perfect
knowledge.”21
Despite the business judgment rule’s power as an affirmative
defense, courts have found that directors violate their duty of care
when they “openly eschew … stockholder wealth maximization.”22
In the seminal case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, Henry Ford,
as director, sought to use company profits to expand production
and cut prices rather than release dividends to stockholders. 23
-sports-stocks-that-could-score-you-big-profits.html [https://perma.cc/G4L3-T8XR]
(noting that as of the date of writing, only four teams have traded publicly in
the U.S.).
16 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000) (presuming that
corporation’s directors must act in the best interest of the company); see also
infra Section I.A (explaining why the corporate model is incongruous to an individual franchise).
17 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
18 Id.
19 Lori McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as Immunity Doctrine, 4
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 521, 526 (2013).
20 Id. at 527.
21 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d. Cir. 1982).
22 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010).
23 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 671 (Mich. 1919).
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The court found that it was unlawful for directors “to shape and
conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit
of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others,”
and that it would be a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties to
“sacrifice the interests of shareholders.”24
A more recent case, eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,
furthered the doctrine of shareholder primacy.25 There, Craig
Newmark and James Buckmaster were majority shareholders
and board members of Craigslist, Inc.26 Feeling that it was not in
the firm’s “culture” to focus on maximizing profits, Newmark and
Buckmaster adopted a corporate policy that specifically stated the
corporation’s purpose was not to maximize the company’s value.27
The court held that such a policy breached Newmark and
Buckmaster’s fiduciary duties to Craigslist’s shareholders, stating
that, as a corporation, Craigslist must operate primarily for the
benefit of its stockholders.28 Therefore, any plan that “openly eschews” shareholder primacy breaches the fiduciary duty of care.29
Consequently, any sports franchise seeking to incorporate
would have to operate in a profit-maximizing capacity.30 Although
one may think that winning games and making money are closely
intertwined (after all, it would make sense that the more games a
team wins, the more fans it draws, and the more tickets and merchandise it sells), it may not be that simple.31 Academics are split
on whether sports franchises typically act in a win-maximizing or
profit-maximizing capacity.32
Id. at 684.
See eBay, 16 A.3d at 35.
26 Id. at 6.
27 Id. at 35.
28 Id. at 34.
29 Id. at 35.
30 If a sports franchise incorporated and operated with a plan that “openly
eschew[ed]” shareholder primacy it would violate eBay. See id.
31 PAUL DOWNWARD & ALISTAIR DAWSON, THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL
TEAM SPORTS 30 (2002).
32 Compare Mohamed El-Hodiri & James Quirk, An Economic Model of a
Professional Sports League, 79 J. POL. ECON. 1302, 1305 (1971) (stating the goal
of most team owners is profit maximization), with RODNEY D. FORT & JAMES
QUIRK, PAY DIRT: THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 279 (1997) (finding that “the profit maximization model is inapplicable”), and Peter J. Sloane,
The Economics of Professional Football: the Football Club as a Utility Maximiser,
24
25
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Similar to the directors of Craigslist, team owners seem unlikely to admit that the team’s primary interest is profit.33 Even
when asked specifically about the business goals of a team, owners are likely to defer, such as when Baltimore Orioles owner Peter
Angelos stated, “I … didn’t go into it thinking that this could be
run like you run a widget factory. I consider myself a trustee to
an asset. I don’t think we own the Orioles. I think the people of
Baltimore do.”34 Similarly, Los Angeles Angels owner Arte Moreno
has stated that he is more concerned with winning than making
a profit, even admitting that he dropped concession prices due to
concerns that it is “unaffordable to come to a ball game.”35 Former
Oakland Athletics owner Walter Haas, Jr. was “more of a philanthropist than a businessman” and sought primarily to operate his
team in a manner that would create a kind of civic pride among
Oaklanders.36 In each of these scenarios, owners expressed that
they had forgone maximizing the franchise’s profit—actions that
would be per se duty of care violations under Dodge and eBay.37
There have been a number of specific situations when owners
of a sports franchise would have violated their duty to maximize
the corporation’s profits had their franchises been organized as a
publicly traded corporation.38 One such situation is where an owner
18 SCOTTISH J. POL. ECON. 121, 135 (1971) (arguing that in some scenarios, owners are likely to pursue utility maximization over profit-maximization); see also
Rodney D. Fort & James Quirk, Owner Objectives and Competitive Balance, 5
J. SPORTS ECON. 20, 29 (2004) (concluding that it is extremely difficult to discern whether an owner is operating in a profit-maximizing or win-maximizing
capacity).
33 Tom Van Riper, Today’s Sports Owners: It’s Not About Winning, It’s About
Business, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2013, 1:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomvan
riper/2013/03/02/todays-sports-owners-its-not-about-winning-its-about-business
/print/ [https://perma.cc/D8QA-7WQ5].
34 Hyman et al., The Orioles’ New Owners, BALT. SUN (Oct. 5, 1993), http://
www.baltimoresun.com/sports/horse-racing/bal-mckay100593-story.html [https://
perma.cc/D236-JHLP].
35 Brian Shactman, Billionaire Baseball Owner Putting Wins Over Profit,
CNBC (Mar. 7, 2013, 2:56 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100534102 [https://
perma.cc/UN84-MHG6].
36 MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME 57
(2003).
37 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
38 See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684 (explaining the fiduciary duty to maximize
corporate profits).
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elects to stay in their current city rather than move to a more
profitable location.39 For example, former Oakland Athletics owner
Walter Haas, Jr. purchased the Athletics in 1980 largely to keep
the team in Oakland.40 When Haas decided to sell the Athletics
in 1994, he offered a below market price to any potential buyer
willing to keep the Athletics in town.41
Other owners have been similarly unwilling to move their
team. For example, there was no NFL team in Los Angeles—the
second-largest market in the country—for twenty years prior to
the recent relocation of the St. Louis Rams and planned relocation
of the San Diego Chargers.42 Even then, only three NFL teams
were even interested in moving to Los Angeles,43 and four of the
six least valuable NFL franchises were uninterested.44 Other
than the Rams and the Chargers, of the more than 130 professional
sports franchises in the four major professional sports leagues,
only three—the Washington Nationals (relocating from Montreal),
the Oklahoma City Thunder (relocating from Seattle), and the
For an interesting discussion on which cities could financially best support additional sports teams, see The Cities With Too Few Sports Teams,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 21, 2016, 2:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/smartassetcom/the-cities-with-too-many-_b_8020750.html [https://perma.cc
/CJ7J-6XR3].
40 Dwight Chapin, Bay Area Saddened by Walter Haas Death, S.F. GATE
(Sept. 21, 1995), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Bay-Area-saddened-by-Walter
-Haas-death-3129783.php [https://perma.cc/JRB7-XR3A].
41 Id.
42 Ken Belson, Rams Moving to Los Angeles Area, and Chargers Could Join
Them, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/sports
/football/rams-moving-to-los-angeles-area-and-chargers-could-join-later.html
[https://perma.cc/3J7H-MB4U] [hereinafter Belson, Rams Moving]; Sam Farmer
& Nathan Fenno, Double Teamed: Chargers make move to Los Angeles official,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/sports/nfl/la-sp-chargers-move
-la-20170111-story.html [https://perma.cc/TDA3-EEWL]. The Rams’s value approximately doubled upon their move to Los Angeles. Ken Belson, Team Locations
Keep N.F.L. Moving Up Financially, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/sports/football/chargers-los-angeles-san-diego-nfl.html
[https://perma.cc/YGS8-E93C].
43 Belson, Rams Moving, supra note 42.
44 See Ken Belson, NFL to Weigh Three Teams’ Proposals on Moving to Los
Angeles, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/sports
/football/nfl-to-weigh-three-teams-proposals-on-moving-to-los-angeles.html?_r
=0 [https://perma.cc/GWD7-74VZ].
39
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Winnipeg Jets (relocating from Atlanta)—have moved within the
past ten years, despite the presence of open, larger markets.45
Other owners are willing to spend far above market value in
order to ensure they sign certain players.46 For example, infamous
former New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner, in his pursuit to acquire the most talented free agents, was well-known for his
willingness to spend huge sums on players with no concern for
whether he was signing players for amounts greater than their
actual market value.47 Ultimately, incorporating would remove
the ability of those owners to act in such a manner.48 They could
no longer base their actions upon a philanthropic commitment to
their particular city; rather, their decisions would be required to
adhere to the best interests of the corporation.49 While it is certainly likely that a portion of a team’s stockholders would be made up
of local fans excited to own a part of their favorite team, diversified
stockholders are interested in one thing: a profitable portfolio.50
They would not hesitate to bring a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty should an owner fail to act in a profit-maximizing capacity.51
B. The Duty of Loyalty
Board members owe their corporation a duty of loyalty, meaning they have a duty to act with “constant, unqualified fidelity” to
ROSNER & SHROPSHIRE, supra note 12, at 240; see also The Cities With
Too Few Sports Teams, supra note 39.
46 The highest-paid free agents are the most likely to be overpaid. Duane W.
Rockerbie, Marginal Revenue Product and Salaries: Moneyball Redux 13, 15
(Univ. Lethbridge, MPRA Paper No. 21410, 2010), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen
.de/21410/1/MPRA_paper_21410.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9EF-CQ9A].
47 Joe Nocera, Was Steinbrenner Just Lucky? N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/business/17nocera.html [https://perma.cc
/QM7S-QQZ4].
48 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
49 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
50 See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
51 So-called “professional plaintiffs”—investors looking to make money via
shareholder litigation—have long plagued corporate law. These investors jump
on any opportunity to sue a corporation for a breach of their fiduciary duty. See
Jessica Erickson, The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder Litigation, 65
FLA. L. REV. 1089, 1137–38 (2013).
45
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their corporation.52 Two common ways in which directors may
breach their duty of loyalty are by usurping a corporate opportunity or by engaging in self-dealing.53 The corporate opportunity
doctrine holds that a director may not take for himself any interest acquired “for the benefit of the corporation.”54 Further, when
a corporation has a reasonable expectancy in an opportunity and
has the financial ability to undertake the opportunity, a director
may not seize the opportunity for himself.55
Self-dealing, as the name implies, occurs when directors find
themselves on both sides of a transaction.56 Specifically, it occurs
where there is a transaction “between a corporation and [one] or
more of its directors” or “between a corporation and any other ...
organization in which [one] or more of its directors ... have a financial interest.”57 A self-dealing transaction is presumptively a
breach of the duty of loyalty.58 A self-interested deal may be sanitized by approval by a majority of disinterested directors,59 an
approval by a majority of shareholders,60 or when the entire deal
is intrinsically fair.61
Had former Los Angeles Dodgers owner Frank McCourt been
subject to a duty of loyalty, his actions in usurping a corporate opportunity almost certainly would have breached that duty.62 In 2011,
McCourt, on behalf of the Dodgers, negotiated a television agreement
with Fox, giving Fox the right to televise Dodgers games.63 From the
agreement, McCourt received a $385 million loan, using eighty
million dollars of that loan to pay off debts associated with his
divorce.64 He also received five million dollars designated explicitly
Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144(a)(1)–(2) (2010) (describing the duty of loyalty).
54 Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
55 Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154 (Del. 1996).
56 See tit. 8 § 144(a) (describing self-dealing transactions).
57 Id.
58 Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6–7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944).
59 Tit. 8 § 144(a)(1).
60 § 144(a)(2).
61 § 144(a)(3).
62 Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154–55 (Del. 1996).
63 Edvard Pettersson, Los Angeles Dodgers Owner, Ex-Wife Settle Divorce
Dispute, BLOOMBERG (June 17, 2011, 9:13 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2011-06-17/los-angeles-dodgers-owner-mccourt-settles-divorce-dispute
-with-ex-wife [https://perma.cc/E5F3-453K].
64 Id.
52
53
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for his personal use.65 Thus, McCourt benefited to the tune of
eighty-five million dollars merely from his position as Dodgers
owner.66 This money should have belonged to the Dodgers, and
McCourt’s usurpation of the loan—had the Los Angeles Dodgers
been a publically traded corporation—would have almost certainly been a violation of the corporate opportunity doctrine.67
Similarly, in the early 1990s, the New York Yankees partnership obtained a loan worth one-hundred million dollars, which
was against the franchise’s lucrative cable contract.68 The partnership then agreed to distribute the proceeds of the loan among
its seventeen partners.69 Majority owner George Steinbrenner used
his portion of the proceeds to bail out American Ship Building
Company, of which he was the controlling stockholder.70 Because
Steinbrenner stood on both sides of the deal, the transaction
would have been a breach of loyalty unless Steinbrenner took the
necessary steps to sanitize the deal.71
Id.
See id.
67 Again, an officer usurps a corporate opportunity when he has taken advantage of a business opportunity and:
(1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity;
(2) the opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business;
(3) the corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and
(4) by taking the opportunity for his own, the corporate fiduciary
will thereby be placed in a position inimicable to his duties to
the corporation.
Broz, 673 A.2d at 155. The Dodgers—like other sports franchises—frequently
deal in television contracts and have an expectancy in the profits resulting
from such deals. McCourt usurped the team’s opportunity to profit.
68 Jack Curry, BASEBALL; Steinbrenner Defends Loan from TV Contract,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/16/sports/baseball
-steinbrenner-defends-loan-from-tv-contract.html [https://perma.cc/76QY-RZS5].
69 Id.
70 Allan Sloan, Steinbrenner Waits for his Shipbuilding Firm to Come In,
WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 1992), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business
/1992/01/21/steinbrenner-waits-for-his-shipbuilding-firm-to-come-in/c1afc17e
-daa3-4b4d-91a5-0ce89e002bfb/ [https://perma.cc/8WRR-N3A3].
71 Had the Yankees been a public corporation, Steinbrenner could have sanitized this self-interested transaction by gaining approval by a majority of disinterested directors, approval by a majority of the team’s stockholders, or proving
that the entire transaction was “intrinsically fair”—meaning the deal was both
65
66
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II. THE CORPORATE MODEL AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES
A. Current Organization
No American professional sports league has organized itself as
a publicly traded corporation.72 Rather, each of the four major professional sports leagues have remarkably similar governance
structures.73 Each league operates as an unincorporated non-profit
association.74 Additionally, an elected commissioner acts as president of each league.75 Commissioners have a significant level of job
security, holding their positions on average for more than fifteen
years, nearly fifty percent longer than the average corporate Chief
Executive Officer (CEO).76 The commissioner answers primarily to
the league’s board of governors—termed the Executive Council in the
MLB,77 the Executive Committee in the NFL,78 and the Board of Governors in the NHL and NBA.79 In the NBA, NFL, and NHL, those
boards are made up of one representative, usually the owner,80 from
procedurally and substantively fair. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144(a)(1)–(3)
(2010); see also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
72 See CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION art. 2 (2012) [hereinafter NBA CONSTITUTION]; CONSTITUTION AND
BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. 2 (2006) [hereinafter NFL
CONSTITUTION]; CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE art. 2 [hereinafter NHL CONSTITUTION]; MAJOR LEAGUE CONSTITUTION art. 2.1 (2005)
[hereinafter MLB CONSTITUTION].
73 See NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 2; NFL CONSTITUTION, supra note
72, art. 2; NHL CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 2; MLB CONSTITUTION, supra
note 72, art. 2.1.
74 See NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 2; NFL CONSTITUTION, supra
note 72, art. 2.2; NHL CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 2.2; MLB CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 2.1.
75 See NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 24; NFL CONSTITUTION, supra
note 72, art. 8; NHL CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 6; MLB CONSTITUTION,
supra note 72, art. 2.
76 Eric Chemi, Looking for Job Security? Try Running a Major Sports League,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2014, 3:48 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014
-09-15/roger-goodell-and-job-security-sports-commissioners-dont-quit [https://
perma.cc/T6SV-444J].
77 See MLB CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 3
78 See NFL CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 6.
79 See NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 18; NHL CONSTITUTION, supra
note 72, art. 5.
80 See Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The
Commissioner and an Alternative Approach from a Corporate Perspective, 6
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 65, 69 (1995).
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each team.81 Somewhat differently, the MLB’s board is made up
of the league commissioner and eight “Club [M]embers,” who are
representatives from four franchises in each of the National and
American leagues.82 Club members are hand-picked by the commissioner and confirmed by a majority vote of the franchise owners.83
There is, however, some question as to whether the four major
professional leagues actually qualify as non-profit unincorporated
associations (NUAs), or whether they are better labeled as joint
ventures.84 This is an important—and unresolved—question,85 as
classification as a joint venture would require owners to exhibit
different fiduciary duties than would classification as a NUA.86
Members of joint ventures owe to each other a duty of loyalty87 and
a duty of care.88 With NUAs, however, laws are somewhat split.89
The Revised Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Associations Act
(RUUNAA), which has been adopted by four states and the District of Columbia,90 mandates that managers owe duties of loyalty
and care to the organization.91 Differently, thirteen states follow
RUUNAA’s predecessor, the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit
Associations Act (UUNAA), which does not discuss fiduciary duties.92
81 See NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 18(b); NFL CONSTITUTION,
supra note 72, art. 6.1; NHL CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 5.1–5.3.
82 MLB CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 3.1.
83 See id.
84 See Nadelle Grossman, What is the NBA?, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 101,
126 (2015) (“[T]he NBA may be a partnership, even though there is some basis
to conclude it is a NUA.”).
85 See id. at 112.
86 See id. at 112–13.
87 See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior.”); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997).
88 REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(c).
89 See REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 23 (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2009); see also Elisabeth S. Miller, Doctoring the Law of Nonprofit
Associations with a Band-Aid or a Body Cast: A Look at the 1996 and 2008
Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Acts, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
852, 853 (2012); Grossman, supra note 84, at 124.
90 See PERI H. PAKROO, STARTING AND BUILDING A NONPROFIT: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE 16 (Marcia Stewart ed., 6th ed. 2015).
91 REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 23(a) (2008).
92 See Miller, supra note 89, at 853, 867.
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Other states have no statutory law for NUAs, instead relying on
common law.93 New York—the state in which all four of the power
four leagues are headquartered—falls into this third category.94
There, the common law views NUAs as merely contractual relationships, imposing no fiduciary duties.95 As a result, depending
upon whether one classifies the four major professional sports
leagues as joint ventures or as NUAs, the managers within the
leagues may or may not owe fiduciary duties to the league at large.96
The remainder of this Note will assume that the leagues are correct
in classifying themselves as NUAs, but it is important to remember that managers may already owe the league fiduciary duties.
B. Fiduciary Duties and a Public Professional Sports League
The four major professional sports leagues are remarkably
profitable and, like other profitable entities, have ambitious goals
for future revenues.97 In 2013, the NFL made $10.5 billion,98 and
NFL commissioner Roger Goodell recently announced the league
had set a goal of $25 billion in annual revenues before 2027.99 Similarly, the MLB and new commissioner Rob Manfred recently announced they hope to reach $15 billion in annual revenues sometime
in the next few years.100 The focus on revenues and the setting of
financial goals—as well as the job requirements of expertise in
Id. at 853.
Here, New York law is controlling. Each of the four leagues are headquartered in New York, and thus New York has more ties to the leagues’ transactions
than any other state. See Grossman, supra note 84, at 124.
95 Id. at 128.
96 Id. at 126.
97 See Monte Burke, How The National Football League Can Reach $25 Billion
In Annual Revenues, FORBES (Aug. 17, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/monteburke/2013/08/17/how-the-national-football-league-can-reach-25
-billion-in-annual-revenues/ [https://perma.cc/HTY5-AL8S]; Eric Fisher, MLB
Setting ‘A Big Goal’ of $15 billion in Revenue, SPORTS BUS. J. (Jan. 19, 2015),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/01/19/Leagues-and-Gov
erning-Bodies/MLB-owners.aspx [https://perma.cc/WB4U-GYHR].
98 Chris Isidore, NFL: Richer than Ever, Despite Controversy, CNN MONEY
(Sept. 11, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/11/news/companies/nfl
-revenue-profits/index.html?iid=EL [https://perma.cc/DG7S-GJSB?type=image].
99 Burke, supra note 97.
100 See Fisher, supra note 97.
93
94
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the areas of economics, negotiation, and lobbying—make the commissioner and his surrounding officers’ job descriptions appear
much like those of a CEO and a corporation’s board of directors.101
1. The Duty of Care
While individual team owners may be somewhat likely to
breach their fiduciary duty of care to the corporation by prioritizing
winning over finishing in the black,102 the league office suffers
from no such temptation.103 Team owners are automatically biased
toward adopting policies that benefit their team, whereas the commissioner and his league office act as a neutral governing body.104
Additionally, like the board of directors of any corporation, one
of the league office’s primary focuses is profit.105 In order to keep
the owners who elected the commissioner happy, the league office
must pursue policies and plans that will maximize returns to the
owners.106 Even when a league office is under intense public scrutiny, such as the NFL and Commissioner Roger Goodell in 2014
and 2015, it appears that all that matters to owners is profit.107
Kevin Allen & Erick Brady, A Commissioner’s Job Description Changes
With the Times, USA TODAY (Aug. 13, 2014, 9:19 PM), http://www.usatoday.com
/story/sports/mlb/2014/08/13/commissioner-bud-selig-adam-silver-roger-goodell
-gary-bettman/14016343/ [https://perma.cc/3RZE-7A2A].
102 See supra notes 29, 47–51 and accompanying text.
103 See David Falk, Are Professional Sports Leagues’ Control Over Their
Member Teams and Owners in Doubt?, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 337, 338–39 (2012)
(noting that the league is structured to “promote and foster” all teams rather
than prioritizing one team over another) (internal quotations omitted).
104 See infra notes 130–37 and accompanying text.
105 See TREVOR SLACK & MILENA M. PARENT, UNDERSTANDING SPORT ORGANIZATIONS: THE APPLICATION OF ORGANIZATION THEORY 40 (2d ed. 2006).
106 Leagues have revenue sharing schemes that distribute league profits
amongst teams. See CONRAD, supra note 4, at 15, 147–48, 171.
107 NFL commissioner Roger Goodell’s actions regarding the suspension of
Ray Rice for domestic violence and his handling of the “DeflateGate” scandal
brought Goodell an incredible amount of criticism. See Juliet Macur, Ray Rice
Ruling Highlights Roger Goodell’s Missteps, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/29/sports/football/ray [https://perma.cc/6E56-AEJX];
Sally Jenkins, DeflateGate Exposed Roger Goodell as Unfit to Serve His Office,
WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins
/deflategate-exposed-roger-goodell-as-unfit-to-serve-his-office/2015/09/03/6b1a
0688-5267-11e5-8c19-0b6825aa4a3a_story.html [https://perma.cc/R2ME-H6HV].
Still, all thirty-two league owners support Goodell, primarily because of the
101
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Further, the policies league owners pursue indicate that they
already operate in a profit-maximizing manner.108 For example,
one of the primary functions of a league office is to promote competitive balance amongst the league’s teams.109 The rationale behind
creating a competitively balanced league stems from the “uncertainty of outcome” hypothesis, which theorizes that more competitive leagues engender greater interest, leading to an increase in
revenue.110 In order to create a balanced environment, each of the
four major professional sports leagues has adopted a revenue
sharing system whereby revenues of the most profitable teams
are partially redistributed to less profitable teams in order to increase
the ability of poorer teams to sign high-caliber, talented players.111
Additionally, each of the four major professional sports leagues,
with the exception of the MLB, employs a salary cap, which limits
the amount of money any one team may spend on player salaries.112
In total, a league office acts as a profit-maximizer, not a winmaximizer.113 As a result, unlike individual team owners, league
offices already operate in a manner that adheres to the fiduciary
duty of care.114
overall success of the league under his reign. See Ben Volin, Why Do NFL Owners Still Back Rodger Goodell as Commissioner?, BOS. GLOBE (July 25, 2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2015/07/24/commissioner-roger-goodell-job
-money-bank/Fp5z6XtINLsEcoMQzBO1QI/story.html [https://perma.cc/FB8Z
-A9WF].
108 See, e.g., James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance:
Sports Antitrust Claims After American Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517,
521–26 (2011).
109 See id.
110 See DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 31, at 21 (internal quotations
omitted).
111 See John Vrooman, Theory of the Perfect Game: Competitive Balance in
Monopoly Sports Leagues, 34 REV. INDUS. ORG. 5, 6 (2009).
112 See id. at 7. The NFL and NHL use a hard cap, where every team is
forbidden from surpassing a set number for player salaries. See id. at 21–22.
On the other hand, the NBA uses the more lenient soft cap, which allows teams
to surpass the salary cap in a number of different, well-defined scenarios. See
id. at 19. For more information on the NBA’s salary cap exceptions, see Jorge
Castillo, NBA Free Agency: Salary Cap Exceptions Explained, WASH. POST
(July 3, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010
/07/02/AR2010070202011.html [https://perma.cc/Z54R-38ZB].
113 See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.
114 See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch.
2010) (stating that fiduciary duties are satisfied by promoting value).
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2. Duty of Loyalty
Whereas individual franchises that go public may expose
themselves to liability stemming from a breach of their duty of loyalty,115 a public league office is much more unlikely to face liability
stemming from a breach of its duty of loyalty.116
First, as discussed above, directors of NUAs in some states already owe a duty of loyalty to the organization as well as to the
other members of the NUA.117 Armed with knowledge of potential
liability in the event that they are in a jurisdiction that holds that
NUAs must operate as fiduciaries, leagues already have incentive
to act in accordance with a duty of loyalty.118
Second, due to the immense public scrutiny that league commissioners face,119 leagues may already be acting in accordance
with a duty of loyalty.120 Under scrutiny from the twenty-four-hour
sports media and millions of sports fans,121 leagues must already
be careful about partaking in any action that may garner negative
press.122 On the other hand, team owners, comparatively, live much
115 See Lentze, supra note 80, at 85; see also supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
116 See Lentze, supra note 80, at 80 (noting that the league office is both
independent and impartial).
117 See supra notes 84–94 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 84–94 and accompanying text.
119 See, e.g., Sean Gregory, Roger Goodell’s Worst Words, TIME (Dec. 10,
2014), http://time.com/3629318/roger-goodell-nfl-rice-testimony/ [https://perma.cc
/9BBC-2ZNN] (describing the NFL and Commissioner Goodell as under “the
most intense public scrutiny the NFL has ever seen”); Matt Norlander, David
Stern Greeted by Boos at His Final NBA Draft As Commissioner, CBS SPORTS
(June 27, 2013), http://www.cbssports.com/nba/eye-on-basketball/22550795/david
-stern-greeted-by-boos-at-his-final-nba-draft-as-commissioner [https://perma.cc
/A9VY-RVC9] (reporting that former NBA Commissioner David Stern, who held
the position for thirty years, was booed by fans at his final NBA draft despite
the fact that his reign as commissioner was “undeniably successful”).
120 See infra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
121 See HANDBOOK OF SPORTS AND MEDIA 70 (Arthur A. Raney & Jennings
Bryant eds., 2009) (describing how the media’s constant coverage of sports has
resulted in the “Benign Viewer Factor,” meaning that, in today’s world, everyone has some knowledge of the latest current events in sports because “knowledge
of sport is one of the important currencies of interpersonal communication.”).
122 Shaun Powell, The Perils of Power, SPORTS ON EARTH (Sept. 26, 2012),
http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/39035706/ [https://perma.cc/FVL2-DLCL]
(noting that league commissioners have become “public pin cushion[s]” for criticism).
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more private lives,123 meaning it is simply easier for their actions
to fly under the radar.124 Therefore, due to the careful watch of
the public eye, league commissioners are simply much less able
to participate in the sort of self-interested transactions or usurping of corporate opportunities as compared to individual team
owners, lest they subject themselves to twenty-four-hour scandal
coverage by the sports media.125
III. THE BENEFITS OF A PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
LEAGUE GOING PUBLIC
A. Corporate Governance
1. Elimination of the Collective Action Problem
By organizing as a corporation with a unified board of directors,
sports leagues could rid themselves of the collective action problems that hamper their success.126 A collective action problem occurs when “it is in individuals’ self-interest not to contribute to a
group activity even though all of the individuals would be better
off if everyone were to contribute.”127 Consequently, “each individual is made worse off by pursuing her own self-interest.”128 In
the context of professional sports leagues, the requirement that
123 Some owners prefer remaining in the background; others are quite the
opposite. Compare Peter Bella, Rocky Wirtz: The Quiet Man Deserves His Due, CHI.
NOW (June 15, 2015, 10:51 PM), http://www.chicagonow.com/interesting-chicago
/2015/06/rocky-wirtz-the-quiet-man-deserves-his-due/ [https://perma.cc/68LT
-ZKGU] (describing Chicago Blackhawks majority owner Rocky Wirtz as “faceless
and nameless”), with Tim MacMahon, Cuban Era Has Been Anything but Boring,
ESPN (Jan. 5, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/dallas/columns/story?columnist
=macmahon_tim&id=4793301 [https://perma.cc/5ZU8-JMXN] (discussing Dallas
Mavericks owner Mark Cuban’s rise as a prominent public figure and love of
the limelight).
124 See Bella, supra note 123 (noting that despite an owner having “put excitement back into Chicago hockey,” he remains relatively unknown and under
the radar).
125 See HANDBOOK OF SPORTS AND MEDIA, supra note 121, at 70–71.
126 James B. Perrine, Media Leagues: Australia Suggests New Professional
Sports Leagues for the Twenty-First Century, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 703, 785
(2002).
127 Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 72–73 (2007).
128 Id. at 73.
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most actions, such as accepting a new broadcasting deal or expanding the league, require a supermajority vote of the owners
creates a collective action problem because (1) franchise owners
have an incentive to “hold-out” from supporting initiatives that
benefit the league at large but harm their individual franchise,
and (2) unsophisticated owners may lack the business acumen to
identify and make efficient business decisions.129
First, franchise owners are likely to be swayed by the economic
interests of their individual franchise, which may not be congruent with the economic interests of the league as a whole.130 For
example, Baltimore Orioles owner Peter Angelos sternly fought
the plan to relocate a MLB franchise to neighboring Washington,
D.C., fearing that the new franchise would pull from the Orioles’s
fan base.131 Angelos conceded to the relocation—and the Washington Nationals came into existence—only once he received an
enormously one-sided offer: the creation of a new sports television
channel to televise Orioles and Nationals games in which the Orioles would retain an initial 90 percent ownership interest, with
the Nationals’s interest slowly increasing on a yearly basis until
it reaches a mere 33 percent.132 Considering the fact that the MLB
owned the Nationals at the time of their relocation,133 the league
was effectively paying Angelos a portion of the league’s potential
revenues.134 Angelos’s actions represent the ability of a single voting
129 Roger G. Noll, Major League Sports, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRY 381–82 (Walter Adams ed., 6th ed. 1982).
130 Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 604
(7th Cir. 1996) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (“There is, however, no reason to expect
that the current team owners will necessarily make ... decisions efficiently, given
their individual economic interests in the financial health of their own teams.”).
131 Steve Fainaru, Angelos, Selig Last Men Standing in D.C.’s Way, WASH.
POST (June 29, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A133
86-2004Jun28.html [https://perma.cc/Q78U-2SNZ] (quoting ex-MLB executive
council member Claude Brochu: “[Angelos] could say, ‘Don’t screw me,’ and I
think everybody would listen to what he would have to say, just because he
would be a partner.”).
132 Jonah Keri, For The Birds, GRANTLAND (Feb. 5, 2014), http://grantland.com
/features/baltimore-orioles-offseason-spending-al-east/ [https://perma.cc/UP4Y
-W8XJ].
133 Id.
134 Jayson Stark, MLB Lays Out Incentive Plan for Angelos, EPSN (Sept. 28,
2004), http://www.espn.com/mlb/columns/story?id=1888266 [https://perma.cc
/2MGZ-GYYR] (noting that MLB will make up the difference in the event of
revenue shortfall).
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member to “hold … out” and prevent or otherwise hinder a league
from taking an efficient action.135 The only actions that a league
will ultimately adopt are those that benefit a supermajority of
owners, rather than those that, on average, benefit the league as
a whole.136 As a result, holding out impedes innovation and leads
leagues to adopt conservative agendas due to an inability to upset
the status quo.137
Second, members of each league’s board of governors, with the
exception of the MLB, are made up of one representative, usually
the owner,138 from each team.139 However, there is no guarantee
that the board of governors will be comprised of educated, rational
businessmen who are likely to make good decisions.140 Consequently, each innovative idea “must appeal to some entrepreneurs
of below-average vision and ability.”141 Compounding the problem
is that franchise owners tend to be “risk-averse billionaires.”142
Together, a lack of business acumen and an overly conservative
approach leads to inefficiency, as leagues miss out on new, innovative ideas.143
A solution to this collective action problem is a single, unified
board of directors acting for the betterment of the league at
large.144 No board member would be tempted to hold the league
hostage for his own franchise’s interests because no board member
Noll, supra note 129, at 382.
Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519, 551 (1997).
137 See Noll, supra note 129, at 382.
138 See Lentze, supra note 80, at 69.
139 See id.
140 Noll, supra note 129, at 381.
141 Id. at 382.
142 Felix Gillette & Ira Boudway, Roger Goodell at the 50-50 Yard Line,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 2014, 6:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles
/2014-09-18/roger-goodells-nfl-commissioner-job-security-is-up-to-team-owners
[https://perma.cc/3CDZ-P374] (describing why NFL owners will refuse to remove Roger Goodell despite his shortcomings).
143 Id.
144 Perrine, supra note 126, at 783 (“[A] single firm will establish the objectives of the enterprise and have the power to direct the actions required to obtain
these goals. The absence of multiple firms in the management hierarchy ... will
greatly reduce the ‘below-average visionary’ and ‘holdout’ problems common to
innovation in traditional leagues.”).
135
136
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would have an economic interest in any one team.145 Additionally,
the board, presumably made up of corporate professionals with the
requisite vision and ability to direct a large-scale corporation,
would not be held back by owners who do not possess such expertise; therefore, the league would be much more likely to adopt
more efficient policies, rather than retain the status quo.146
2. CEO Accountability to the Board
Today, league commissioners have an immense amount of job
security, with their average tenure being far greater than the average large company CEO.147 This job security is not necessarily
well-deserved, as evidenced by Roger Goodell’s tumultuous nineyear reign as NFL Commissioner.148
Part of the problem may be that sports commissioners have
too much power.149 While a board of directors oversees the actions
of their CEO, a league’s owners do not oversee the actions of their
commissioner.150 This places the Commissioner in an unusual
scenario, for although “the Commissioner acts as an employee of
the league, [he] is not under the control and supervision of [his]
own employer.”151 Further, because each league’s board of governors
Even if a team owner was voted onto the league’s board of directors, it
would be difficult for that owner to avoid a duty of loyalty violation, as he would
often be swayed towards participating in self-interested transactions that benefit
his team to the exclusion of others. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
146 See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(“Shareholders’ investment interests, across the full range of their diversifiable
equity investments, will be maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk
adjusted returns available that are above the firm’s cost of capital.”).
147 See Chemi, supra note 76.
148 See Macur, supra note 107. After a series of mishandled scandals, popular
sports writer Bill Simmons declared, “Roger Goodell is the worst sports commissioner of my lifetime.” Bill Simmons, The Goodell-Must-Go Bag, GRANTLAND
(Sept. 11, 2014), http://grantland.com/the-triangle/roger-goodell-need-to-step-down/
[https://perma.cc/YU3H-3FH4]. After posing to himself the question of how
Goodell managed to keep his job, Simmons wrote, “I don’t know, I don’t know,
I seriously don’t know.” Id.
149 Simmons, supra note 148.
150 Lentze, supra note 80, at 68–71.
151 Id. at 72.
145
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suffers from a collective action problem in which owners have incentive to “hold out” or may lack business acumen,152 it is difficult
to meet the supermajority of votes necessary for commissioner removal.153 Again, as a result, leagues are conservative and elect to
retain the status quo.154
Adopting a corporate structure, with the commissioner as CEO,
would mitigate some of the negative consequences of the current
model.155 Lacking a collective action problem, the league’s board
of directors would make well-informed, unified decisions in pursuit of established goals.156 Additionally, when crafting its bylaws,
the league could elect to give its board of directors the power to
remove the commissioner by a simple majority vote.157 The league’s
board of directors would then have the power to hold the commissioner personally accountable for any missteps.158 With a unified
vision and an accountable, competent commissioner, the league
would be better able to successfully pursue the type of efficient
behavior that shareholders prefer.159
B. Limitless Opportunity for Capital
A primary reason that companies choose to go public is the
large amount of capital available through an IPO.160 In 2014, 244
IPOs brought in gross revenue of 74.4 billion dollars, with nine
IPOs each bringing in over one billion dollars.161 In recent years,
See Noll, supra note 129, at 382.
See, e.g., NFL CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, § 6.5(B),(E).
154 See Noll, supra note 129, at 382–83.
155 Id. at 382–84.
156 Id. at 381–82.
157 Corporations have wide authority in crafting the manner in which they
elect their officers. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 142(b) (2010) (“Officers shall be chosen in such manner and shall hold their offices for such terms as are prescribed
by the bylaws or determined by the board of directors or other governing body.”).
158 See id.
159 Through their power to hold the commissioner accountable, shareholders
incentivize the commissioner to “honestly assess risk and reward,” which in
turn maximizes shareholders’ interests. See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc.,
683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
160 CARL S. SCHNEIDER ET AL., GOING PUBLIC: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND
CONSEQUENCES 2 (1999).
161 2015 IPO Report, WILMERHALE 2 (2015), https://www.wilmerhale.com/up
loadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/2015-WilmerHale
-IPO-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6644-G9NS].
152
153
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the IPOs of companies such as Alibaba ($25 billion), Visa ($17.9
billion), Facebook ($16 billion), and General Motors ($15.8 billion)
were some of the largest of all time.162 Further, a publicly traded
professional sports league would have ongoing access to capital
beyond the time of the IPO.163 The benefit of liquidity makes investors more likely to invest, and, if the league needed a substantial
sum of money for an acquisition or investment, the league would
have the option of conducting a secondary offering.164
1. Stadiums
The sports world has experienced an explosion of new, luxurious
sports stadiums.165 Since the early 1990s, 90 percent of all American sports teams have replaced their stadiums, and, on average,
five new facilities are built each year.166 As stadiums continue to
be built at an unprecedented rate,167 teams seek to “one-up” other
new stadiums, leading to a rapidly increasing cost as each team
seeks to establish the new “gold standard” of stadiums.168 To illustrate the rapid growth in the cost of new stadiums, plans from
the late 1990s estimated the total cost of new stadiums for the
Baltimore Ravens and Cleveland Browns to be $229 million and
$315 million, respectively.169 In comparison, the new home of the
Dallas Cowboys opened in 2011 at a cost of $1.2 billion,170 and the
162 Laura Lorenzetti, The 7 Biggest U.S. IPOs Ever—including some surprises, FORTUNE (Oct. 22, 2014, 4:46 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/10/22/these
-are-the-7-biggest-u-s-ipos-ever/ [https://perma.cc/HV8G-D33F].
163 See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 160, at 2.
164 See GAIL CLAYTON HUSICK & J. MICHAEL ARRINGTON, THE INITIAL PUBLIC
OFFERING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR EXECUTIVES 169, 174 (Wilson, Sonsini,
Goodrich, & Rosati, P.C. 1998).
165 ROBERT C. TRUMPBOUR, THE NEW CATHEDRALS: POLITICS AND MEDIA IN
THE HISTORY OF STADIUM CONSTRUCTION 2 (2007).
166 See Aaron Gordon, America Has a Stadium Problem, PAC. STANDARD
(July 27, 2013), http://www.psmag.com/business-economics/america-has-a-sta
dium-problem-62665 [https://perma.cc/23CM-T77Y].
167 See id.
168 Martin J. Greenberg, Sports Facility Financing and Development Trends
in the United States, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 93, 103–04 (2004).
169 Aaron Kuriloff & Darrell Preston, In Stadium Building Spree, U.S. Taxpayers Lose $4 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 5, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-09-05/in-stadium-building-spree-u-s-taxpayers
-lose-4-billion [https://perma.cc/GX4F-ERGD].
170 See id.
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new Minnesota Vikings stadium opened in 2016 at a cost of $1.1
billion.171
In order to finance the building of a new stadium, team owners
turn to the public, on average requesting that the local municipality
bear between 30 and 60 percent of the total cost.172 Team owners and
the public officials who support public financing of the stadium
propagate two central rationales for allowing the team to use public funds: (1) without funding for a new stadium, the team will
leave for a new city, and (2) a new stadium will kick-start economic rejuvenation in the areas surrounding the new location.173
Whereas the threat of relocation if public officials are unwilling
to strike a deal may be real,174 the prediction that a new stadium will
bring economic benefits to the city is largely false.175 Officials and
team owners often try to persuade the public that a new stadium
171 Kim Slowey, Minnesota Vikings Show Off New $1.1B U.S. Bank Stadium, FORBES (July 22, 2016, 3:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kim
slowey/2016/07/22/minnesota-vikings-show-off-new-1-1b-u-s-bank-stadium/#110
e20de21ee [https://perma.cc/K9Eb-S96V].
172 See DELANEY & ECKSTEIN, supra note 7, at 25–26.
173 See JOANNA CAGAN & NEIL DEMAUSE, FIELD OF SCHEMES: HOW THE
GREAT STADIUM SWINDLE TURNS PUBLIC MONEY INTO PRIVATE PROFIT 33–35
(1998).
174 Other than the recent relocation of the St. Louis Rams, three professional
teams—the Montreal Expos (to Washington), the Charlotte Hornets (to New
Orleans), and the Seattle Supersonics (to Oklahoma City)—have relocated at
least partly due to a denial of public assistance in financing a new stadium
since the turn of the century. See CONRAD, supra note 4, at 203; see also Quebec
Says No to Expos, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Sept. 4, 1998), http://articles.orlando
sentinel.com/1998-09-04/sports/9809040377_1_montreal-expos-baseball-stadium
-bouchard [https://perma.cc/AN7L-3LZR]; Lori Montgomery & Thomas Heath,
Baseball’s Coming Back to Washington, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2004), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A60095-2004Sep29.html [https://
perma.cc/5626-7XHJ]; Jessica Kowal, As Sonics Pack to Leave Town, Seattle
Shrugs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/13/us
/13seattle.html [https://perma.cc/SW5Z-8G26]. Having between two and four
vacant cities that could support a team is the optimal number for a sports
league, as that number is enough to worry fans of a potential move, but it is not
enough to incentivize the formation of a competing league. See John Siegfried
& Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Sports Facilities and Their Communities, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 95, 98 (2000).
175 See Pat Garofalo & Travis Waldron, If You Build It, They Might Not Come:
The Risky Economics of Sports Stadiums, ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www
.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/if-you-build-it-they-might-not-come
-the-risky-economics-of-sports-stadiums/260900/ [https://perma.cc/D58W-P8NL].
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will provide economic growth by funding studies estimating a
high economic impact.176 However, economists have nearly unanimously found that there is no causal connection between a new
sports stadium and economic growth.177 In fact, one study found
that out of thirty cities with new stadiums, twenty-seven of those
stadiums had no impact, with the final three negatively affecting
the local economy.178
Further, there is cause for concern that taxpayers may be less
willing to fund new stadiums in the future.179 There is evidence to
suggest that, after being fooled once, the public becomes doubtful
as to the legitimacy of the economic growth argument.180 Specifically, one study found that in cities with two new sports stadiums,
advocators pushed the economic growth argument regarding the
first stadium, but they abandoned the argument when pushing
for the second stadium.181 This suggests that local taxpayers are
catching on to the fact that a new stadium will not bring economic
growth.182 Additionally, this removes one of the new stadium advocates’ two central arguments for why the public should provide
assistance in financing the construction of the new stadium.183
One recent trend may be illustrative of the future of the economic growth argument.184 In recent years, taxpayers in several
U.S. cities have rejected hosting the Olympic Games mostly due
to the significant financial burden it would place on the taxpayers
in order to construct the facilities necessary for the Games.185
See CAGAN & DEMAUSE, supra note 173, at 35. For an in-depth look at
the common flaws in such economic impact studies, see DELANEY & ECKSTEIN,
supra note 7, at 27–30.
177 DELANEY & ECKSTEIN, supra note 7, at 27.
178 CAGAN & DEMAUSE, supra note 173, at 35.
179 Id. at 34–36.
180 See id. at 34–36.
181 Id. at 34–36.
182 Id.
183 See id. at 34–36.
184 See infra notes 185–86 and accompanying text.
185 See Victor A. Matheson, Why Democracies Don’t Want the Olympics Anymore, WASH. POST (July 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/postevery
thing/wp/2015/07/29/why-democracies-dont-want-the-olympics-anymore/ [https://
perma.cc/AH68-C4RD]. Specifically, voters were split as to whether they supported New York and Chicago’s bids for the 2012 and 2016 Games, and support
for Boston’s bid for the 2024 games was just 40 percent. Id.
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Public disapproval of financing such stadiums due to taxation
concerns may signal to future public officials that voters could be
similarly unlikely to support new stadiums for their local
teams.186 Without voter and public official support for public financing, team owners would have to look elsewhere to find the
large amount of capital necessary to construct a new stadium.
A solution to this problem would be to finance new stadiums using the capital obtained from an IPO.187 First, this would remove
payment for the stadium from the hands of the taxpayer—who
may not be a sports fan at all, much less a fan of the team—to the
hands of those who have made the voluntary choice to invest in
the league.188 Second, this may lead to a more efficient use of stadiums.189 No longer would owners, who know that the public will
bear a significant portion of the cost,190 replace usable or repairable stadiums with an entirely new facility.191 Rather, a corporate
league office would focus on maximizing its return on investment
when constructing a new sports stadium.192 Consequently, the focus would likely shift to building long-lasting stadiums rather
than the overly expensive and short-lived stadiums of today.193
See id.
Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1261 (“Although not a sports corporation in
its purest form, the Green Bay Packers illustrate the efficacy of utilizing a public
offering to raise capital sufficient for stadium construction and renovation.”).
188 DELANEY & ECKSTEIN, supra note 7, at 25–26.
189 With privately owned stadiums, directors will be obligated to run them
in a profit-maximizing fashion. See generally, eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
190 See Kuriloff & Preston, supra note 169.
191 In addition to the increased rate of construction, the lifespan of the average sports stadium appears to be shrinking. See Harry Dole, Alarming Decrease
in Longevity of Pricy Modern Sports Stadiums, RANT SPORTS (Dec. 13, 2012),
http://www.rantsports.com/nfl/2012/12/13/alarming-decrease-in-longevity-of-pricey
-modern-sports-stadiums/ [https://perma.cc/H6DK-VHQB]. Remarkably, the
Atlanta Falcons have plans for a new stadium after just twenty-five years in
the Georgia Dome, and Washington Redskins owner Dan Snyder has said it is
time the team looks at building a new stadium after just seventeen years at
current home FedEx Field. Id.; see also The Short Life of an NFL Stadium,
CNN MONEY (Sept. 8, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/08/news
/companies/nfl-stadiums/ [https://perma.cc/6ZGM-MKT7].
192 League offices are profit-maximizers. See Volin, supra note 107.
193 See generally Dole, supra note 191; Volin, supra note 107.
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2. Worldwide Expansion
An increasingly globalized world has exposed American sports
to new fans all over the planet.194 As a result, expansion to and
involvement in the international market is a top priority of the
four major professional sports leagues, with each league adopting
methods to expand its popularity and grow its fan base overseas.195
For example, in the 2013 NBA season, teams played games in
Brazil, the United Kingdom, China, the Philippines, Spain, Taiwan,
and Turkey.196 The NBA Finals were broadcasted in 215 countries
and forty-seven languages.197 Similarly, NFL teams played games
in London and are interested in playing games in Mexico, Germany,
Canada, China, and Brazil in the near future.198 The MLB has
played season-opener games in Monterrey, Mexico (1999), San
Juan, Puerto Rico (2001), Tokyo, Japan (2000 and 2004), and has
even opened a Tokyo office.199 The MLB has also created the World
Baseball Classic—a kind of “World Cup” of baseball—which has
been widely considered a success.200
Additionally, three of the four major professional sports
leagues have found themselves in a de facto arms race as to which
league will be the first to open a permanent franchise located outside the United States or Canada.201 The NFL hopes to open a
See generally infra notes 202–05 and accompanying text.
See Benjamin D. Goss, Taking the Ballgame Out to the World: An Analysis
of the World Baseball Classic as a Global Branding Promotional Strategy for
Major League Baseball, 1 J. SPORT ADMIN. & SUPERVISION 75, 77–78 (2009).
196 Jeré Longman, Globalization Sweeps Away Misgivings About Foreign
Teammates, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/15
/sports/international/globalization-sweeps-away-misgivings-about-foreign-team
mates.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/U8PH-J23Y].
197 Id.
198 Ryan Wilson, NFL Could Expand International Series to Mexico, Germany,
CBS SPORTS (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-football/251
24431/nfl-could-expand-international-series-to-mexico-germany [https://perma.cc
/8GNW-2X5F].
199 Goss, supra note 195, at 77, 82. After the opening of the Tokyo office,
multiyear Asian sponsorships of MLB rose by 40 percent. Id. at 82.
200 Mike Berardino, Despite Successes, World Baseball Classic Still Finding
Its Footing, BASEBALL AM. (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.baseballamerica.com/today
/majors/international-affairs/world-baseball-classic/2013/2614790.html [https://
perma.cc/EA7L-LFJJ].
201 See generally id.; Goss, supra note 195; Wilson, supra note 198.
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London franchise by 2022.202 MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred has
listed Monterrey, Mexico as a potential destination,203 and others
speculate that the easing of relations between the United States
and baseball-obsessed Cuba may lead the MLB to expand to Cuba.204
NBA Commissioner Adam Silver has gone as far as to say it is the
NBA’s “manifest destiny” to expand to Europe, although he admits expansion overseas is not in the NBA’s immediate future.205
Despite each leagues’ immense popularity in the United States,
garnering enough interest to validate placing an expansion team
overseas will be a difficult task.206 Mark Reeves, International Commercial Director for the NFL, has equated the task of engendering
enough overseas support to justify expansion into Europe to “pushing [a] boulder up [a] mountain.”207 However, this is a boulder that
a publicly traded NFL, with an immense amount of capital gained
through an IPO, could likely push singlehandedly.208 The NFL, or
any of the power four leagues, would have access to enough capital to build the kind of state-of-the-art stadium that would stir
the surrounding communities’ interest in the new team.209 Startup costs could be borne not by the taxpayers of the international
expansion location (who, it seems, would be unwilling to finance
Wilson, supra note 198.
Jerry Crasnick, Commissioner Rob Manfred Sees Expansion in MLB’s
Future, ESPN (July 14, 2015), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/13256319/rob
-manfred-sees-expansion-mlb-future [https://perma.cc/NRA6-2D3X].
204 See David Lengel, Will a US-Cuba Deal Open Up an MLB Gold Rush?,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2014, 9:51 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog
/2014/dec/18/will-a-us-cuba-deal-open-up-a-gold-rush-in-the-mlb [https://perma.cc
/8MY9-GN62].
205 Owen Gibson, NBA Commissioner Adam Silver Wants to Launch Four
European Franchises, GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2015, 7:28 PM), http://www.theguard
ian.com/sport/2015/jan/15/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-european-franchises
?CMP=share_btn_tw [https://perma.cc/F8QU-6D8U] (“We’re not there yet. I
know that as much growth as we’ve seen, we have a long way to go before we
can sustain four franchises in Europe…. On the other hand, I believe it’s our
manifest destiny to expand.”) (internal quotations omitted).
206 See Jack Bechta, How NFL Can Expand Abroad, HUFFINGTON POST
(Oct. 25, 2012, 9:33 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/25/how-nfl-can
-expand-abroad-london_n_2016085.html [https://perma.cc/4MDG-CMFN].
207 Id.
208 See generally id.; Greenberg, supra note 10.
209 See generally Bechta, supra note 206; Greenberg, supra note 10.
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building a stadium for a sport they know little about), but by the
league itself.210
Further, current league policies reduce the incentive for potential owners to undertake a risky venture like opening a team
overseas.211 Expansion and relocation fees—amounts new teams
pay equally to each already-existing team in the league—have
grown rapidly.212 The St. Louis Rams’s relocation cost them $550
million in such fees, and the San Diego Chargers’ planned relocation may cost them $650 million.213 Additionally, potential new
owners will be cautioned by the failings of the four major leagues’
only overseas expansion effort—NFL Europa.214 NFL Europa, a
ten team developmental league that the NFL opened in 1991,215
operated at a loss for fifteen straight years before shutting down
in 2007.216 Considering the combination of the immense expansion fee and the uncertain success of an American sports league
team in an international market, a sports league may find itself
hard-pressed to find a potential owner willing to purchase an international expansion team.217 Again, this problem can be solved
See Bechta, supra note 206; DELANEY & ECKSTEIN, supra note 7, at 25.
See generally infra notes 212–13 and accompanying text.
212 Leveling the Playing Field: Relevant Product Market Definition in Sports
Franchise Relocation Cases, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245, 274 (2000). An expansion fee “represents compensation to existing teams for more extensive sharing
of the monopoly profits from broadcasting.” ROGER G. NOLL & ANDREW ZIMBALIST,
SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 84 (1997).
213 Rams Headed Back to Los Angeles; Chargers Have Option to Join, ESPN
(Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/14558668/st-louis-rams-relo
cate-los-angeles [https://perma.cc/YPV7-LM6L] (stating that the move cost the
Rams $550 million in relocation fees); Judy Battista, Chargers’ Move to Los
Angeles Fraught With Uncertainty, NFL (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.nfl.com
/news/story/0ap3000000773166/article/chargers-move-to-los-angeles-fraught-with
-uncertainty [https://perma.cc/28JB-VYER] (stating that the Chargers’s relocation fee may be up to $650 million).
214 NFL Europa Closes, NFL (Aug. 3, 2007, 2:28 PM), http://www.nfl.com
/news/story/09000d5d801308ec/article/nfl-europa-closes [https://perma.cc/AYV9
-G89B].
215 Id.
216 Len Pasquarelli, NFL Europa Failed to Produce Players, Profits, ESPN
(June 29, 2007), http://espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=Pasquarelli
_len&id=2920635 [https://perma.cc/X8UX-E8F8].
217 See generally NFL Europa Closes, supra note 214; Rams Headed Back to
Los Angeles; Chargers Have Option to Join, supra note 213.
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through financing the expansion team by a publicly traded sports
league.218 As discussed above, these leagues—unlike an individual
potential new owner—believe that expansion is their “manifest
destiny,”219 and they are much less likely to be concerned with an
expansion fee or the riskiness of international expansion.
CONCLUSION
This Note outlines the various reasons why a professional sports
league would stand to benefit from organizing as a publicly traded
corporation. While individual franchises have flirted with the concept of going public—including several launching IPOs—the corporate model is much more applicable to an entire league rather than
a singular franchise. Unlike a publicly traded team, which may
be more likely to breach their duty of care by operating as a winmaximizer, leagues are focused entirely on profits. Further, the
constant attention and scrutiny garnered by professional sports limit
the ability of leagues to breach their duty of loyalty by engaging
in self-interest doctrines or by usurping corporate opportunities.
While in the current model leagues suffer from a collective action problem and a lack of commissioner accountability, a publicly
traded sports league solves those problems. By creating a unified
board of directors with a singular, clear vision for the future of
the enterprise, leagues will become more flexible and better able
to make the efficient decisions necessary to best serve the interests of the league.220
Additionally, a publicly traded league would gain an immense
amount of capital via its IPO.221 This capital would allow the
league to finance building new stadiums for its franchise, which
is of particular importance as evidence suggests that taxpayers
will begin to refuse to provide owners with funds for new stadiums in the future. It would also allow leagues to accomplish an
important—and expensive—goal: overseas expansion.222
See generally Greenberg, supra note 10.
Gibson, supra note 205.
220 See Perrine, supra note 126, at 783.
221 See Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1261–63.
222 See generally Greenberg, supra note 10; NFL Europa Closes, supra note
214; Pasquarelli, supra note 216; Rams Headed Back to Los Angeles; Chargers
Have Option to Join, supra note 213.
218
219

576 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:545
While a novel idea, it is somewhat difficult to imagine one of
the four major professional sports leagues abandoning their current model.223 This is not because the corporate model is not a
viable (or better) option, but because owners and commissioners
stand to lose a substantial amount of power via the internal
checks and balances—as well as shareholder elections—that the
corporate model provides.224 Still, as leagues and owners look to
maximize efficiency and capital in order to finance future initiatives, it is a viable alternative.
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